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PRACTICING CRIMINAL LAW:




INTRODUCTIONO UR secular society cycles as to whether it glorifies defense attor-
neys or prosecutors. Sometimes, we adore defense attorneys-
they are the lawyers who ensure that innocents are not punished,
"L.A. Law" is the show to watch, and the attorneys to imitate. Other
times, we revere prosecutors-they are the lawyers who punish evil-
doers, "Law and Order" is the show to watch, and the attorneys toimitate. Jewish tradition recognizes the inherent ethical difficulties
with the conduct of both types of attorneys.
Jewish law recognizes that the societal imposition of the criminal
justice system on citizens, who othenvise function in accordance with
their own communal norms, is a significant burden on the community,
both to prosecute criminals and to defend them. Thus, while Jewish
tradition unanimously recognizes the central duty to participate in the
common commercial practices and financial laws of the host country
through the principle of the "law of the land is the law,"1 participation
in the criminal law process-either to prosecute criminals or to defend
them-is much more problematic. The dilemma is simple: the prose-
cution of Jews for "crimes" where the punishment seems vastly differ-
ent than that mandated by Jewish law, or even where the criminalized
conduct is permitted by Jewish law, seems contrary to Jewish tradi-
tion. On the other hand, defending guilty people from punishment
does not exactly seem in the spirit of Jewish law.
Three distinct issues are involved in a Jewish law discussion of an
attorney practicing criminal law: 1) When is it permissible to inform
upon a person for committing a crime and to serve as a witness at the
trial? 2) May one prosecute criminals? 3) May one represent a per-
son who has been accused of a crime, and what types of defenses can
one present? Each of these issues will be explored at some length.
* Michael J. Broyde is the Senior Lecturer in Law at Emory University School
of Law and Associate Director of the Law and Religion Program at Emory Univer-
sity. During the 1997 academic year, he is on leave from Emory, and is the Director
of the Beth Din of America, a Jewish law court. Much of this material can be found
in Michael Broyde, The Pursuit of Justice: A Jewish Perspective on Practicing Law
(1996). This book discusses various legal and philosophical issues related to practicing
law in common law countries from the perspective of Jewish law, ethics, and tradition.
1. For more on this principle, see Shmuel Shilo, Dina De-Malkhuta Dina (1974).
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I. BEING A WITNESS OR PROSECUTOR
A. Introduction: The Story of Rabbis Joshua and Eleazar
Two distinctly different approaches have been taken by Jewish au-
thorities on the permissibility of a Jew aiding the secular government
in punishing Jews for criminal offenses.' The dispute revolves around
the proper understanding of a Talmudic text. The Talmud states:
Rabbi Eleazar son of Rabbi Simeon met a police officer who had
been sent to arrest thieves. Rabbi Eleazar said to him, "How can
you detect the thieves ... ? Perhaps you take the innocent and
leave behind the guilty." The officer replied, "What shall I do? It is
the King's command." [Rabbi Eleazar then advised the officer how
to determine who was a thief and who was not] ... A report [of this
conversation] was heard in the royal court. They said, "Let the
reader of the letter become the messenger" (i.e., let Rabbi Eleazar
work as a police officer). Rabbi Eleazar son of Rabbi Simeon was
brought to the court and he proceeded to apprehend the thieves.
Rabbi Joshua son of Karchah, sent word to him, "Vinegar, son of
wine! [i.e., inferior son of a superior father] How long will you de-
liver up the people of our God for slaughter?" Rabbi Eleazar sent
the reply, "I eradicate thorns from the vineyard." Rabbi Joshua re-
sponded, "Let the owner of the vineyard come and eradicate his
thorns." . . .A similar incident befell Rabbi Yishmael the son of
Rabbi Yosi. The prophet Elijah appeared to him and rebuked
him .... "What can I do-it is the royal decree," responded Rabbi
Yishmael. Elijah retorted "Your father fled to Asia, you flee to
Laodicea.3
Thus, the Talmud records that two sages were rebuked for assisting
the government in the prosecution of criminals, indicating that this
conduct was not proper, or, at least, was conduct objected to by Rabbi
Joshua.4
B. One Explanation of Rabbi Joshua's Conduct
A number of commentaries advance an explanation which changes
the focus of this reprimand. It has been suggested that Rabbi Yom
2. Throughout these chapters the term "criminal law" will be used to denote
those areas of secular law where the government seeks to physically punish (through
jail or other corporeal punishment) violators of the law. See David ben Samuel
Halevi, Turei Zahav; Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 157:8 [hereinafter Taz]. When the
government uses the criminal justice system to seek only monetary fines (even puni-
tive damages), Jewish law does not classify that as criminal litigation; that is more
properly categorized as civil litigation.
3. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 83b-84a [hereinafter Bava Metzia]. For an
excellent analysis of the issues raised by secular enforcement of criminal law, see J.
David Bleich, Jewish Law and the State's Authority to Punish Crime, 12 Cardozo L.
Rev. 829 (1991).
4. For a discussion of the balancing problems involved in informing from a mod-
em American law perspective, see Jack B. Weinstein, The Informer: Hero or Vil-
lain?-Ethical and Legal Problems, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 8, 1982, at 1.
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Toy Ishbili5 ("Ritva") argues that even Rabbi Joshua-who rebuked
Rabbi Eleazar for working as a police officer-admits that it is only
scholars and rabbis of the caliber of Rabbi Eleazar and Rabbi
Yishmael who should not assist the government as prosecutors or po-
lice officers-and even for these individuals such conduct was not pro-
hibited, but only frowned upon.6 Many authorities state that it is
permissible for an individual to assist the government in appehending
criminals.7 According to this analysis, it is only the pious who should
not engage in this type of activity as it is undignified for scholars to act
as government agents in these circumstances-but all others may.8
Based upon this mode of analysis, Rabbi Hershel Schachter argues:
One critical point should however be added: There is no problem in
informing the government of a Jewish criminal, even if they penalize
the criminal with a punishment more severe than the Torah re-
quires, because even a non-Jewish government is authorized to pun-
ish and penalize above and beyond the [Jewish] law ... for the
purpose of maintaining law and order. However, this only applies
in the situation where the Jewish offender or criminal has at least
violated some Torah law.9
According to this opinion, it is permissible to be a witness or prosecu-
tor against individuals who have committed actions which violate both
Jewish and secular law. 10
5. See Yom Toy Ishbii, Ritva commenting on Bava Metzia 83b as quoted in
Betzalel Ashkenazi, Shittah Mekubetzer (noting that if the king is authorized to punish
criminals, an agent is permitted to assist); see also Bleich, supra note 3, at 840-44.
6. Moshe Schick, Teshuvot Maharam Schick, Hoshen Mishpat, Responsum no.
50, at 21 (noting that Rabbinal authorities should not engage in such activity). This
understanding might be based on an inference from the Jerusalem Talmud. See Jenisa-
lem Talmud, Terumot 8:4, at 32b-33a (indicating that this conduct is only prohibited to
the pious).
7. See Yosef Karo, Beit Yosef, Shullhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 388 [hereinafter
Hoshen Mishpat]; Taz, supra note 2, at 157:7-8; Tzvi Hirsch Shapira, Darkei Teshuvah,
Yoreh Deab 157:1; Meir Simhah of Dvinsk, Or Sameah, Melakhim 3:10.
8. The prohibition of testifying against another Jew found in Hoshen Mishpar,
supra note 7, at 28:3-4, is inapplicable when the legal advice or testimony is both true
and subpoenaed and withholding it would cause a desecration of God's name.
9. Hershel Schachter, Dina DeMalchusa Dina: Secular Law As a Religious Obli-
gation, 1 J. Halacha & Contemp. Soc'y 03, 118 (1981). The person must have violated
a provision of Jewish law in order to be punishable, according to Rabbi Schachter, as
the secular government is only authorized to punish in manners different from Jewish
law, and not to criminalize conduct permitted by Jewish law.
10. See People v. Drelich, 506 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1986). In this case, a person appealed
his murder conviction on the grounds that his confession of the "brutal stabbing mur-
der of his 23-year-old pregnant wife" to his communal rabbi, Rabbi Dr. Moses Ten-
dler, dean and professor at Yeshiva University (as well as Rabbi Moshe Feinstein's
son-in-law), ought not to have been admitted at trial. Rabbi Tendler testified against
the defendant and recounted the confession, which resulted in his conviction. The
court determined that no rabbi-penitent privilege attached as "Ithe defendant's com-
munications to Tendler were made for the secular purpose of seeking assistance in the
retention of counsel, and in negotiating with the prosecutor's office and securing
other assistance in connection with the preparation of his defense to the charges." Id.
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C. A Second Explanation of Rabbi Joshua's Conduct
The second approach rejects the opinion of Rabbi Eleazar, and
states that Rabbi Joshua, who rebuked Rabbi Eleazar, represents the
normative opinion which prohibits this conduct." If Rabbi Joshua's
opinion is normative, then the only time it would be permitted to as-
sist the secular government in criminal prosecutions is where a crimi-
nal poses a threat to the community through his conduct.' Both of
these situations are based upon the rules of a pursuer (rodef). Indeed,
in Jewish law, one who poses a threat to the life of others must be
prevented from accomplishing the intended harm; force-even deadly
force-may be used in such a case without the need for a court hear-
ing. The requirement of a threat does not mean only that the criminal
may actually harm another, but includes such threats as the possibility
that in response to a Jew being apprehended for committing a crime,
other Jews will be injured or anti-Semitism will be promoted.' 3
According to this approach, it is only when there is a possibility that
the lack of punishment of this criminal will lead to other crimes that
the secular authorities should be informed. Indeed, one authority has
argued that on a functional level there is no difference between the
two approaches because disobedience of the law generally will cer-
tainly lead to anarchy and crime, and thus all significant violations of
the law can be punished under the pursuer rationale.' 4
In addition, Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhaki (Rashi), commenting on the
Talmud, seems to argue that Jewish law recognizes that the secular
government may properly enforce any law validly promulgated under
the rule "the law of the land is the law" (dina de-malkhuta dina), even
against Jews. 5 Maintaining law and order is unquestionably one such
function. A proof for this proposition may perhaps be found in Rabbi
Moshe Feinstein's decision permitting one to serve as a tax auditor for
the government in a situation where the audit might result in the crim-
inal prosecution of Jews for evading taxes.' 6
at 748. Rabbi Menashe Klein appears to prohibit this type of conduct. See Menashe
Klein, Mishneh Halakhot 7:285. For a response, see Samuel Turk, Peri Malka 76:2.
11. Such an approach can be implied from Maimonides, Murder 2:4. See Bleich,
supra note 3, at 840-44 (discussing the two alternative views of the Talmudic incident).
12. Shmuel di-Medina, Maharashdam, Hoshen Mishpat 55; Moshe Sternbuch,
Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot 1:850 (stating that the authorities may be apprised of one who
drives recklessly or without a license); see also Moshe Isserles, Rema, Hoshen Mishpat
388:12 [hereinafter Rema] (addressing communal dangers).
13. See Rema, supra note 12, Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 388:12, 425:1 (dis-
cussing one who counterfeits coins). For a complete analysis of the various permuta-
tions of this rule, see Yaakov Blau, Pithei Hoshen, Hilchot Nezikin 4:7, at 144.
14. Zvi Hirsch Chajes, Maharatz Chayes, Torat Nevi'im Ch. 7.
15. Rashi, Gittin 9b; Bleich, supra note 3, at 852-57.
16. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe, Hoshen Mishpat 1:92. It is incorrect to main-
tain that Rabbi Feinstein refers to a tax auditor who can only recommend civil and
not criminal penalties, as no such position exists. Rabbi Feinstein's rationale hinges
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It is important to distinguish between private and public causes of
action. Jewish law does not permit one Jew to bring a lawsuit against
another Jew in secular court alleging a violation of Jewish law, even if
the secular government recognizes that violation of Jewish law as an
impropriety. Thus, for example, Rabbi Feinstein maintains it is pro-
hibited to sue a person in secular court for kashrut (dietary laws)
fraud if that person wiU go to a Jewish court to resolve this claim. 17
Such a case, however, involves two private parties suing each other
and thus is readily distinguishable from Rabbi Feinstein's responsum
permitting one to be a tax auditor, which dealt with the interactions
between the government and a private citizen.
D. Summary
There is a fundamental dispute concerning being a witness or prose-
cutor of Jewish criminals.' 8 Many authorities rule that only those
viewed as of exemplary piety must avoid this activity. Provided that
the criminal prosecution is for conduct which violates Jewish law,
there are no obstacles according to Jewish law (except for the rule
forbidding unseemly actions as violating the "conduct of the pious")
in assisting in criminal prosecutions. Others disagree and rule that it is
prohibited to assist the secular government in criminal prosecutions
unless the criminal poses a danger to society.19
on the legitimacy of the government's collection of taxes and the fact that others will
collect the taxes anyway, and not on the penalties available to the government.
17. Feinstein, supra note 16, at 1:8.
18. Jewish law recognizes, without any doubt, the validity of secular law and its
criminal justice system in the prosecution of gentiles for violation of secular law. The
crucial question addressed in this section is one of jurisdiction. Does Jewish law rec-
ognize that the secular system has jurisdiction to criminally punish those who are
duty-bound to have fidelity to Jewish law, or not.
19. For a general survey of the issues raised in this chapter within the context of
the extradition of a Jewish defendant from Israel to France, see H.C. 852/86, 869186,
Aloni v. Minister of Justice, 41(2) P.D. 1, where Justice Menachem Elon discusses at
great length Jewish law's approach to assisting in the criminal prosecution of Jews.
Commenting on this case, Elon stated:
[S]ome scholars saw in an unfavorable light Jewish assistance in the discov-
ery and extradition to the secular authorities of Jewish criminals, as they felt
it preferable that "the owner of the vineyard-the Lord-should come and
destroy the thorns from the vineyard" rather than deliver these "thorns" to
the judicial authority of rulers who have no mercy for the people and prop-
erty of Jews. Other Sages disagreed and gave assistance, both in theory and
in practice, to the secular authorities in order "to remove the thorns from
the vineyard" ..... One should, however, take care not to act in this way
from the outset for it is not "the teaching of the pious."
In time, even those who had reservations agreed that one should hand
over ab initio Jewish transgressors whose acts could endanger the [Jewish]
public since these people were considered pursuers.. . . Other Sages consid-
ered the extradition of Jewish criminals to the general authorities as a neces-
sity in order to uphold order and public welfare based upon the validity of
the "law of the land is law" which could not be condemned.
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II. DEFENDING ONE ACCUSED OF A CRIME
A. Introduction
Having addressed the question of when it is permissible to assist in
the prosecution of criminals, it is now necessary to determine if one
can aid accused criminals in their defense, and if so, what type of
asssitance is permitted.2" Within the American adversarial system of
justice, while a lawyer may not lie on behalf of his client, he must
defend his client zealously, even if he knows the case against his client
is factually correct.2' This is especially true, and of constitutional
magnitude, in a criminal case where the government bears the burden
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
An initial question must be addressed. May a defendant, according
to Jewish law, plead "not guilty" in secular court to a crime that he
knows he has committed but which the government cannot prove, or
must a Jew plead guilty when charged, if actually guilty? It would
appear that one may plead "not guilty" even if one knows that he is
factually guilty. According to Jewish law, a confession is not admitted
in court, and in fact, does not prove guilt.22 Requiring a person to
plead guilty if he actually is, and, thus, waive his right to a trial, is
tantamount to requiring a person to confess to his crime. A Jew thus
may plead "not guilty" so as to force the government to prove its case
according to the law. 3
While it might appear to some that a defendant is lying when he
pleads "not guilty" if he knows he is factually guilty, such is a misun-
derstanding of the secular law involved. A defendant need not plead
to any offense in American law. In the absence of any plea, a plea of
Menachem Elon, Extradition, in Tehumin 8:263, 277-78 (1988). For two detailed criti-
cisms of Justice Elon's opinion in Nakash, both of which assert that Elon is relying on
Jewish law material inserted for the benefit of the censor, and is not indigenous to
Jewish law, see J. David Bleich, Extradition, supra, at 8:297, and Shaul Yisraeli, supra,
at 8:287.
20. Certainly one may represent a defendant who wishes to plead guilty and only
desires a reduced sentence. Such negotiations are the end result of more than 98
percent of the criminal indictments issued in the United States. See Donald Newman,
Reshape the Deal, Trial May/June 1973, at 11 ("[T]he frequency of convictions by plea
approaches 98% of all those charged.").
21. See, e.g., District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3(a)
(1997) ("A lawyer shall represent a client zealously and diligently within the bounds
of the law."); Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1969) (stating that
a lawyer should "represent [a] client zealously within the bounds of the law"). But see
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3 (1993) which does not mention the
word "zeal" in any form.
22. Maimonides, Laws of Sanhedrin 18:6; Norman Lamm, Self Incrimination in
Law and Psychology: The Fifth Amendment and the Halakhah, in Norman Lamm,
Faith and Doubt (1986).
23. See Yaakov Emden, She'elat Ya'avetz 2:9; J. David Bleich, Contemporary
Halakhic Problems II 349-57 (1979). Rabbi David Cohen (of Gvul Yavetz) notes in a
letter dated 17 Av 5754/July 23, 1994 to this author, that it is obvious that a person
need not plead guilty to a crime, even if he is guilty.
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"not guilty" is entered (in harmony with the American rule of inno-
cent until proven guilty). Thus, by entering a plea of "not guilty," a
defendant does not assert that he is actually innocent-he can only do
that through testimony-but only that he wishes to be tried in a court
of law.24
So too, when the government has not proven its case, a defense
lawyer may advise the jury to acquit his client simply because the evi-
dence has not proven "beyond a reasonable doubt" that his client is
guilty. This is true even if the client has told the lawyer that he is
factually and legally guilty. In the American legal system, as in Jewish
law, the government bears the burden of proving each element of a
criminal charge, and in any situation in which the government has not
done so, the defendant is legally entitled to an acquittal. Any other
rule is tantamount to requiring a Jew who is actually guilty of a crime
to plead guilty, even if the government cannot prove its case. A Jew,
like all other citizens, is entitled to a trial in which the government
meets its burden of proving guilt.'5
B. Assisting the Guilty
Given the fact that a defendant may take steps to ensure that he is
given a fair trial, one might argue that a lawyer representing a defend-
ant could take any action on his client's behalf. This is not so. The
scope of a lawyer's role in aiding a criminal defendant is directly con-
nected to a discussion in the Talmud which states:
It was rumored about certain Galileans that they killed a person.
They came to Rabbi Tarfon and said to him, "hide us." Rabbi
Tarfon replied, "What shall I do? If I do not hide you, you will be
seen. Should I hide you? The Sages have said that rumors, even
though they may not be accepted, nevertheless, should not be dis-
missed. Go and hide yourselves., 26
The reason Rabbi Tarfon declined to aid is in dispute, and this dispute
is critical to understanding the status of criminal defense work accord-
ing to Jewish law.
Rashi states that the reason Rabbi Tarfon would not help these peo-
ple was because if they were guilty, helping them would be prohib-
ited.27 This would imply that Jewish law prohibits aiding defendants
who might be guilty. Tosafot and Rabbenu Asher (Rosh) disagree and
24. This principle can be derived from the American law that a person who testi-
fies that he is innocent when he is not actually innocent, can be prosecuted for per-
jury, but merely pleading "not guilty" when one is actually guilty is not grounds for a
perjury charge as no testimony has occurred.
25. That Rabbi Tarfon did not advise the Galileans who came to him that if they
are guilty they should turn themselves in to the authorities, indicates that a defendant
can plead innocent when charged, as both fleeing and pleading innocent are a form of
resisting imprisonment.
26. Babylonian Talmud, Niddah 61a.
27. Rashi, Niddah 61a.
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argue that the reason Rabbi Tarfon would not help them was because
he was afraid that the government would punish him for helping
criminals escape, but that helping them is halakhically (in accordance
with Jewish law) permitted.28 Most early authorities accept the rea-
soning of Tosafot and Rabbenu Asher.29 According to their explana-
tion, any help which the government allows one to provide would be
permitted, since it poses no danger to the provider (e.g., being a de-
fense attorney).
Rabbi Shlomo Luria argues that this ruling of Tosafot and Rabbenu
Asher only applies in cases where, in the aider's mind, the guilt of the
defendant is in doubt, as it was in the Talmud.30 In the case of known
guilt, no help is permitted. Basing his opinion on this ruling, Rabbi
Hershel Schachter states:
[I]f a lawyer knows that his client has committed a crime, it is for-
bidden for him to help the criminal escape the consequences of his
act, by relying on some technical legal points or other devices. The
lawyer, just as any Jew, is directed by the Torah to "eradicate the
evil from our midst," and may not actively assist someone to avoid
his punishment.31
Thus, according to Rabbi Schachter, a lawyer may not advance "tech-
nical legal points or other devices" when the client is known to be
guilty in fact. On the other hand, it is apparent that the defendant
must be presumed innocent by the lawyer.32
In addition, it is also important to distinguish between those situa-
tions in which the lawyer advances a defense of "technical legal
points" for a client he knows to be guilty, and those situations in
which the lawyer advances defenses that are true, that mitigate the
seriousness of the crime, or that cast doubts on the validity of the gov-
ernment's case. For example, under Rabbi Schachter's ruling, it
would seem that while a lawyer cannot advance at trial a defense of
"my client did not commit the crime" when the client has informed his
lawyer to the contrary,33 a lawyer may advance numerous defenses
28. Tosafot, Niddah 61a and Rabbenu Asher, both quoting Rabbeinu Aha,
She'iltot, Numbers, ch. 129.
29. See Rabbeinu Menachem ben Shlomo, Meiri, Niddah 61a.
30. Shlomo Luria, Hokhmat Shlomo, Niddah 61a; Akiva Eiger, Niddah 61a.
31. Schachter, supra note 9, at 121-22.
32. See Kitzur Piskei ha-Rosh, Niddah 9:5. One could argue that all defendants
who have not told their lawyers that they are factually guilty, have the status of "in
doubt" until conviction at trial. The overwhelming majority of defendants are in this
category. It is clear that this type of reasoning does have some outer limit. For exam-
pie, Rabbi Oshry concludes that Jewish law would prevent a Jewish lawyer from de-
fending a Nazi war criminal, and discusses his response in a case when a lawyer
wished to do so. Ephraim Oshry, Responsa from the Holocaust 104 (1983).
33. This also violates many professional ethics rules. Obviously a lawyer may not
use techniques at trial whose sole purpose is to confuse the finder of fact or to pro-




which indicate that a guilty verdict is inappropriate. Thus, he may
advance an insanity defense, or defenses of necessity, duress, or inad-
vertence, provided that the client has told him that these mitigating
factors are present, or that the lawyer reasonably believes them to be
present. So too, any rule of evidence or law whose goal is one of
"truth-seeking," and whose violation by the prosecution casts doubt
on the credibility of the evidence, may be invoked by a lawyer to the
benefit of a client, since such rules promote justice by the court. Thus,
for example, both hearsay evidence and a confession given after tor-
ture may be suppressed as the evidence's validity may be reasonably
doubted.
The status of the prophylactic rules occasionally promulgated by the
Supreme Court in the field of criminal procedure could be debated.31
While these rules were not authorized in order to ensure justice in a
particular case, they are part of the government's program to reduce
violations of law by governmental officials and to promote justice in
society at large. While the efficacy of such a policy could be, and is,
debated by lawyers, there is little doubt that the goals these policies
seek to advance are ones which Jewish law respects, and also are a
fulfillment of the obligation to eradicate injustice from society.
In the more typical case where the client does not tell the lawyer he
is guilty and instead protests his innocence (notwithstanding the evi-
dence to the contrary), it would seem that a complete defense would
be permitted according to Rabbenu Asher and Tosafot.35 In such a
case, a lawyer may advance all defenses which are tenable and which
the client represents as correct.
Obviously, a lawyer may also advance a defense that the facts, as
stated by the government, do not constitute a crime under the rele-
vant statute, and thus the client ought to be acquitted. For example,
in a prosecution for criminal tax fraud, the defense frequently argues
that not only was no crime committed, but that the tax return of the
defendant was properly filed, and the IRS is misinterpreting the rele-
vant tax law. 6
34. See eg., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). A "prophylactic rule" corre-
sponds to the rabbinic concept of a "fence around the Torah" (seyag latorah) and
refers to those rules designed to remove the temptation to violate the law. Mapp, for
example, ruled that illegally seized evidence will not be admitted into court. This rule
created a "fence" around the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of illegal searches and
seizures by reducing the incentives on a police officer to violate the law, as the prod-
ucts of such searches may not be used in court.
35. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
36. It is permissible under Jewish law to challenge the IRS's understanding (called
Regulations) of the Internal Revenue Code, as the executive branch of the federal
government is not constitutionally given the power to interpret laws in a manner that
binds citizens. That task is left to the judiciary, whose interpretation binds the other
two branches, as well as the citizenry. Thus, in America, dina de-malkhuta dina only
applies to laws that the judiciary sanctions as valid.
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C. Assisting the Guilty: A Second Approach
An understanding of Rabbi Tarfon's dilemma, different from that
advocated by Rabbi Luria, is possible and better explains the position
of She'iltot, Tosafot, and Rabbeinu Asher. The She'iltot, Tosafot, and
Rosh, might in fact make no distinction between known guilt and
mere rumors of guilt. Rather, Rabbi Tarfon might have hesitated to
act solely out of fear of violating the secular law (and being punished
for that violation). Under this explanation, the sole limitation upon
aiding a person accused of a crime would be the danger to the aider.
All aid permitted by the government, and hence without any danger
to the provider, would thus be permitted. Rabbi Yaakov Ettlinger ad-
vances exactly such an explanation. He denies that there is any intrin-
sic halakhic obstacle to aiding criminals who seek help-and he
asserts this as Rashi's opinion, as well as that of Tosafot and Rabbenu
Asher. He states:
In my opinion one could state that Rashi does not disagree with
She'iltot. When Rashi states that it is prohibited to save the murder-
ers, he does not mean that it is prohibited according to Jewish law to
save them, but rather that secular law prohibits that conduct. Once
secular law prohibits this conduct, Jewish law does also, since saving
these individuals would involve great risk.37
A contemporary rabbi, Menashe Klein, questions whether dina de-malkhuta dina
applies in the United States. He states:
[The applicability of the principle of] dina de-malkhuta dina in our times,
when there is no king but rather what is called democracy needs further
clarification. As I already explained the position cited in the name of Rivash
quoting Rashba, one does not accept dina de-malkhuta dina except where
the law originates with the king. But in a case where the law originates with
the king. But in a case where the law originates in courts, and the judges
have discretion to rule as they think proper, or to invent new laws as they
see proper, there is no dina de-malkhuta dina, as there is no law of the king
.... Indeed, even the government sometimes creates law and the Supreme
Court contradicts it. Certainly in such a system there is no dina de-malkhuta
dina according to Rivash and Rashba.
37. Despite Klein's views, it is important to note that most authorities have held
that dina de-malkhuta dina applies within the United States and have found any
problems caused by the democratic form of government, the judiciary, the jury sys-
tem, or the possibility of judicial review. This was the approach of Moshe Feinstein.
See Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe, Hoshen Mishpat 2:62; Yosef Eliyahu Henkin,
Teshuvot Ibra 2:176; see also Shmuel Shilo, Dina De'malkhuta Dina 157 (1974).
Indeed, once one acknowledges that dina de-malkhuta dina applies to non-monar-
chical governments, it is unclear why other factors would, as a general matter, be
problematic as a matter of Jewish law. There is no apparent Jewish law deficiency in
the secular system for interpreting the law. Even if a king were to promulgate writ-
ten laws, he would undoubtedly delegate the daily responsibility of judging cases to
others, and such judges would have to interpret the law. A secular sytsem must dele-
gate the interpretative function to someone and it is not fatal under Jewish law even if
the secular system were to delegate some aspect of this function to judges, rather than
legislators. Judges are required to determine whether legislative acts are consistent
with legally superceding documents-such as treaties, constitutions, or even certain
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If this approach is correct, and it certainly best reflects the formula-
tion of Tosafot and Rabbenu Asher, any form of aid legally permitted
by the secular society (e.g., being a defense attorney) would be
halakhically permitted, as it is only because of the danger to the aider
that one may not help a criminal.3" According to Rabbi Ettlinger, the
only type of aid prohibited is that which the secular government does
not allow. 39
Particularly in light of American law, Rabbi Ettlinger's position ap-
pears logical. Since the secular government not only allows, but actu-
ally requires that a criminal be represented by a competent lawyer at
trial (a conviction is invalid without this representation), a lawyer's
participation as a defense attorney simply ensures that society fulfills
its obligation to remove evil from its midst-but only in the manner
that society has designated as just.'
According to both approaches, a lawyer may not assist a client in
the creation of a false defense-i.e., allowing his client or any other
witness to commit what the lawyer knows to be perjury. Needless to
say, such conduct is prohibited under relevant American law as well.'
other legislative acts. There is no reason why a secular legal system division of power
between legislative and judicial branches should impair dina de-mnalkhuta dina.
In any event, even if there were some irregularity in the secular procedure for ap-
plying the law, and even if this would deny Jewish law validity to the outcome of a
secular case, it would not prevent dina de-malkhuta dina from rendering the substan-
tive rules of secular law valid as a matter of Jewish law. For example, disputes be-
tween Jews, even when dina de-malkhuta dina applies, are supposed to be litigated in
Jewish courts who would decide the dispute in accordance with secular law rules. In
such instances, the Jewish courts themselves would serve as the fact-finders. For more
on this issue, see Michael J. Broyde and Steven Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Modem
Business Structures: The Corporation Paradigm, 43 Wayne L Rev. (forthcoming
1998). See also Yaakov Ettlinger, Arukh la-Ner, Niddah 61a (emphasis added); see
also Yaakov Emden, She'elat Ya'avetz 2:9 (explaining Niddah 61a in a similar man-
ner); Moshe Schreiber, Hatam Sofer 6:14 (same); Yaakov Breish, Helkat Yaakov 4:23
(same); Asefat Zekenim, Niddah 61a (same); Yosef Shapira, Hiddushei Mahari Sha-
pira, Niddah 61a (same).
38. Rashi could be arguing that secular law can halakhically prohibit this activity.
See Rashi, Gittin 9b. Tosafot and Rabbeinu Asher reject this rule. See Tosafot, Gittin
9b; Rabbeinu Asher, Gittin 9b; see also Bleich, supra note 3, at 852-57 (discussing the
principle of dina de-malkhuta dina).
39. On a practical level, there is nearly no distinction between the positions taken
by Rabbi Luria (Hoklunat Shlomo) and Rabbi Yaakov Ettlinger (Antkh la-Ner). The
sole point in contention would be whether a lawyer could advance defenses at trial
not on the issue of the person's guilt but on procedural issues for a person who has
acknowledged to the lawyer his factual guilt.
40. Such a conclusion was reached (albeit with somewhat different reasons) by
Rabbi David Cohen (of Gvul Yavetz) in a letter to this author dated 17 Av 5754/July
23, 1994 (on file with author).
41. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that a lawyer may, and most
states require that he must, inform the court of perjury by his client); see also Harry I.
Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission" Reflections on the "Right" to Pres-
ent a False Case, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 125 (1987) (stating that false defenses are




Numerous individuals, whose guilt was never doubted when their
trial began, have shown themselves through able defenses, to have
been factually innocent of the charges brought. Regrettably enough,
history is also full of innocent people who were punished because of
unavailable or incompetent defense attorneys. That is not to say that
all defense strategies are permissible-many are not-but rather, the
zealous advocacy of truthful defenses enhances, rather than detracts
from, justice in society. To the extent a lawyer helps his client to ben-
efit from legal rules designed to ensure justice, such conduct is permit-
ted, and perhaps even mandated, according to Jewish law.4"
CONCLUSION
Jewish law is of two minds on both of the topics we have addressed.
On the question of prosecuting criminals, one view accepts that such
conduct is truly proper conduct, and that Jewish law and ethics view
the intrusion of secular society into Jewish society to punish those who
violate the law as basically proper. The second approach views such
intrusions as less than ideal, to be limited to cases of profound danger
to health and welfare, and certainly not to be encouraged. On the
question of defending criminals, the same two views can be encoun-
tered, in the reverse. One view essentially says guilty people ought to
be punished by society, and it violates Jewish law to defend them. An-
other view avers that a spirited defense is proper for all, and the Jew-
ish tradition allows for every defense technique permitted by the
criminal justice system.
42. One final note is needed. It is important to distinguish between the role of a
lawyer in defending a particular client, and the role of a lawyer, as an informed citi-
zen, in shaping public policy. Merely because Jewish law permits-in the opinion of
some authorities-one to offer a full zealous defense for a specific client in a criminal
case does not mean that lawyers should not seek reform of the criminal justice system,
even if that reform reduces either the rights of those accused of crimes or the role of
attorneys in trials. These broader public policy issues, however, are of no relevance
when a lawyer defends a specific person charged of a specific crime. The lawyer's
goal in such a case should be to provide the best defense of that client permitted by
Jewish and American law.
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